In this paper, we survey the recent empirical literature on sovereign debt and default and point to areas in which the mapping of theory to data can be tightened. We also point to a number of avenues along which we believe future empirical research into the stock and price of sovereign debt, the occurrence of sovereign default, and the institutional environment within which decisions to borrow and default are made, would be especially fruitful in developing our understanding of sovereign debt.
Introduction
Sovereign states have borrowed money for hundreds of years. Sovereign debt was one of the first financial assets ever traded, and continues to comprise a significant fraction of global financial assets. Unlike private debt, sovereign debt is especially difficult to enforce. For centuries, the legal doctrine of sovereign immunity limited suit against defaulting sovereigns, while few government assets are available for attachment in foreign jurisdictions.
The long history of sovereign debt and the associated enforcement problem have attracted researchers in many fields. In this paper, we survey empirical work by economists, historians, and political scientists. As we review the empirical literature, we emphasize parallel developments in the theory of sovereign debt. One major theme emerges. Although recent research has sought to balance theoretical and empirical considerations, there remains a gap between theories of sovereign debt and the data used to test them. We recommend a number of steps that researchers can take to improve the correspondence between theory and data.
Sovereign Debt
In this section we describe research on the quantity, currency composition, and maturity structure of sovereign debt, as well as contractual clauses that govern restructuring in the event of a default.
Measuring the Stock of Sovereign Debt
Data on the stock of sovereign debt are typically presented at face value. Defined as the undiscounted sum of future principal repayments (including, in the case of consols, principal that is repaid at infinity), face values have two obvious problems. First, they do not discount future flows, and thus treat similar-sized payments separated in time as equivalent. Second, they only capture principal repayments. Thus, two debts with equal cash-flows divided into principal and interest in different proportions will have different face values.
To correct for differences in contractual structure, analysts should compute the face value of a common portfolio of debts that replicates the cash flows of the original debt. For instance, they could calculate face values as if each payment were a maturing zero-coupon bond, a concept Dias, Richmond and Wright (2011) refer to as zero-coupon equivalent (ZCE) face values. To correct for differences in timing, analysts should compute the present value of the debt. Alternatively, they could measure a debts market value. However, market values are not available for small borrowers and untraded debts, such as official loans, project credits, and many bank loans.
The ideal measure depends on the purpose for which the data will be used. When assessing the sovereign's debt burden, for example, we typically wish to know the amount of contracted payments. Market values would be misleading, because market values fall when traders expect the sovereign to default. Conversely, when measuring how much creditors expect to recover following a default, market values are more informative than contracted payments.
How Important Is Sovereign Debt as an Asset Class?
Sovereign debts have always been one of the largest classes of financial assets. To illustrate their importance, Table 1 presents public debt as a share of all assets.
The first set of columns gives the face value of all securities on London Stock Exchange, the world's largest and most important capital market for most of the 19 th and early 20 th Centuries. In 1853, British public debt accounted for 70% of listed securities, and foreign public debt totaled another 6%. Over the next 60 years the value of sovereign debt continued to rise, but corporate stock grew at an even faster pace. Consequently, on the eve of World War I, sovereign debt was only 35% of the London market. flows under the Bretton-Woods system and the inward-oriented development strategies that many less developed countries were adopting.
From its nadir in the 1970s, sovereign debt has grown in prominence and now accounts for about 19% of global financial assets. A number of factors help explain this resurgence. Beginning in the 1970s, governments dismantled controls that had impeded capital flows for much of the postwar period. At the same time, the surge in oil prices left petroleum exporters with a windfall that needed to be invested overseas (the so-called "recycling of petro-dollars"). In the next section, we quantify the indebtedness of sovereign countries.
How Indebted Are Sovereign Countries? Figure 1 depicts the evolution of sovereign indebtedness for an aggregate of 72 low and middle income countries Wright 2011, 2012) . Each line plots a different measure of debt scaled by the Gross National Income (GNI) of the country. All measures peak in 1987 at the height of the debt crisis, with the contractual face value of debt peaking around 40% of GNI, while ZCE face values peak at over 60%. The medium gray lines show that the market value of sovereign debt (estimated using a constant 10% rate, and market yields) lies below its face value, with the discount declining toward the end of the sample. The aggregate disguises significant variation across countries. The ZCE face value of debt, which controls for differences in contractual structure of debts across countries, peaked around 80% of GNI for the countries of Latin America, compared to 110% in subSaharan Africa, and less than 50% in East and South Asia (Dias, Richmond and Wright 2011).
Neither face values nor market values are necessarily informative as to the burden of servicing a country's debt. Dias, Richmond and Wright (2012) measure a country's debt burden as the "equivalent variation" of debt forgiveness (the extra resources required to make a country as well off as if it had no debt) and show that, for a variety of market imperfections, this can be calculated by valuing the cash-flows of a country's debts using the consumption capital asset pricing model. As shown in Figure 1 , this internal country value always lies below the market valuation. This is consistent with economic theory: when capital markets are imperfect -for example, because of borrowing constraints or default risk -borrowing countries will value current resources more, and future resources less, than creditors.
Debts levels of the magnitude presented in Figure 1 
What is the Maturity of Sovereign Debt?
Countries with large amounts of short-term debt are vulnerable to "roll-over crises," which occur when the government cannot issue new loans to repay maturing ones (Cole and Kehoe 1999 , Chang and Velasco 2000 . In the mid-1990s, Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, Russia, and Brazil all experienced debt crises that were exacerbated by having debts with short maturities (Rodrik and Velasco 1999) .
To summarize the maturity structure of sovereign debt, researchers often use contractual maturity, the date of the last principal repayment. Another common measure is Macaulay duration, defined as the elasticity of a debt's present value with respect to a constant discount rate (typically a market yield), and calculated as the discounted cash-flow weighted average of the dates of future cash-flows.
Both measures are suboptimal. Contractual maturities are uninformative about the profile of cash-flows over the life of a debt, and duration has the counter-intuitive property that it discounts more distant payment dates. Moreover, two countries with equivalent debt portfolios will have different durations, simply because of different discount rates. Likewise, duration fluctuates with interest rates, even though debt contracts have not changed. An alternative measure that avoids these problems is the undiscounted cash-flow weighted average of the dates of future cash-flows, which we refer to as the zero-coupon-equivalent weighted average life of a debt portfolio.
Using unpublished data from Dias, Richmond and Wright (2011, 2012), we compute each of these measures for the year 2000 for a sample of 137 low and middle income countries. Across countries, contractual maturity varied from 10 to 40 years (see also Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler 2010). In contrast, duration-assuming a 5% discount rate-ranged from 3.4 to 14.2 years, with a mean of 7.1. These durations exceed the estimates from previous studies with smaller samples ( Finally, the ZCE weighted average life in the database was just over 9 years, with some countries as low as 3.9 and others as high as 19. Dias, Richmond and Wright (2011) also find that the ZCE-weighted average lives of sovereign bonds have changed substantially over time, rising from 6 years during the 1980s, to 15 years during the Brady restructuring process, and trending back to 10 years by the end of the sample.
As noted above, short-maturity sovereign debt could contribute to sovereign debt crises. This concern is accentuated by the finding that maturities tend to shorten during debt crises. Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) measured the duration (using a risk fee interest rate) of new bond issues by 4 emerging market economies. During crises, the duration of new debt issues fell by about 1-2 years. Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) also illustrate the problems associated with using contractual maturity: whereas duration fell during crises, contractual maturities often lengthened.
Why Do Countries Issue Debt in Foreign Currencies?
Sovereigns expose themselves to risk not only by borrowing at short maturities, but also by issuing debt that must be repaid in foreign currencies. At first glance, the reason for foreign currency issuance seems obvious: if debt were issued in domestic currency, the sovereign could implicitly default by unexpectedly increasing the inflation rate. Issuing in foreign currency forecloses this option, and presumably results in lower borrowing costs. However, when debts are denominated in foreign currencies, the sovereign is vulnerable to exchange rate risk.
How much borrowing is in foreign currencies? Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2005a) report that between 93% and 100% of all developing country debt is issued in foreign currencies, depending on the measure used. Moreover, outside the main financial centers and Europe, developed countries have between 70% and 90% of their obligations in foreign currencies.
The debts tend to be concentrated in a handful of currencies. Dias, Richmond and Wright (2011) constructed a sample of long term debts owed by 100 developing countries from 1979 to 2006. At any given time, countries had borrowed in about 75 different currencies. However, almost 70% of all debt in 2000 was denominated in U.S. dollars, and the five most important currencies (Dollar, Yen, Euro, Special Drawing Right, and Deutschmark) accounted for more than 90% of the total.
Researchers have found surprisingly little relationship between foreign currency debt issues and measures of inflation or currency depreciation (for example, Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999, or Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza 2005b ). This led Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) to refer to the preponderance of foreign-currency debt as "original sin," in reference to the Christian theological doctrine that all of humanity is in a state of sin as a result of the original "fall of man." Some have conjectured that domestic-currency debt markets are rare due to the fixed costs of opening of such markets, and the need for a large market to produce sufficient levels of liquidity. Consistent with these claims, Bordo, Meissner and Redish (2003) argue that Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa developed domestic-currency debt markets when major shocks-such as wars or the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods System-made it worthwhile to pay the necessary fixed costs. Furthermore, large countries are substantially more likely to issue debt in their own currency (Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza 2005b ).
Sovereign Debt Contracts and Clauses
The risk to creditors also depends on where debts are issued and how debt contracts are written. Das, Papaionnou, and Trebesch (2012) studied the sovereign bonds of 43 emerging market countries in 2009. The majority of bonds were governed by New York law (66% by value, 67% by number). Around a quarter were governed by London law (28% by value, 22% by number), and the remainder were governed by either German or Japanese law. Each of these jurisdictions has its own norms for handling defaults.
In recent decades, policymakers have designed contracts that would make it easier to restructure debts, if necessary (Taylor 2002 , Eurogroup 2011 . They have called for collective action clauses, which allow a super-majority of creditors to impose a settlement on a minority of holdout creditors; engagement clauses, which facilitate the formation of representative groups to negotiate with the sovereign; and aggregation clauses, to help creditors negotiate collectively even if they hold different debt securities.
To document the use of such clauses, Bradley and Gulati (2012) and Choi, Gulati and Posner (2012a,b) collected details on bonds issued between 1990 and 2011. They found that 34% required unanimity to change payment terms, but 66% contained collective action clauses that permitted changes if a super-majority (typically two-thirds, three-quarters, or 85%) of creditors consented. Moreover, the frequency of collective action clauses has risen over time. Prior to the Argentine default in 2001, roughly 95% of sovereign bonds (by number) issued in New York required unanimity to change payment terms (see also Richards and Gugiatti 2003) . After the default, only 21% required unanimity.
Aggregation clauses, which allow the holders of diverse debt instruments to vote collectively to restructure all debts, have now been included in the bonds of four nations (Argentina, Dominican Republic, Greece, and Uruguay), with plans to introduce them in all Eurozone bonds starting in 2013 (Eurogroup 2011). Engagement clauses have also become more common, especially in bonds issued in London. Between 1992 and 2002 only 5% of bonds included such clauses, compared with 34% today.
Finally, researchers have studied pari passu clauses, which obligate sovereigns to treat creditors equally. Holdout creditors have successfully used pari passu clauses to obtain full repayment on bonds in a number of cases (Pitchford and Wright 2012) . Moreover, debt contracts increasingly contain versions of the clause that are especially favorable to holdout creditors; this version of the clause was absent in sovereign bonds prior to 1981, but now exists in 74% of bonds issued by the main emerging market borrowers, and in 21% of sovereign bonds generally (Choi, Gulati and Posner 2012a; Gulati and Scott 2011). This trend is surprising: if borrowers and lenders dislike the use of the pari passu clause by holdout creditors, we might expect the clause to become less common (Wright 2011 provides one interpretation).
Sovereign Default
In this section we examine the phenomenon of sovereign default. We examine how often defaults occur, how long they last, and how creditors and debtors fare in the aftermath of default.
What Is Sovereign Default?
Defined narrowly, default occurs when the debtor violates the legal terms of the debt contract. For example, the debtor might fail to pay interest or principal within the specified grace period, or might breach some other contractual provision. However, this narrow definition overlooks situations in which the sovereign threatens to default and creditors respond by "voluntarily" revising the contract.
In recognition of this problem, credit ratings agencies like Standard and Poor's (S&P) define a default as beginning either when the sovereign breaks the contract, or when the sovereign "tenders an exchange offer of new debt with less favorable terms than the original issue" (Beers and Chambers 2006) . We prefer this broader definition.
To illustrate how definitions matter, consider the 2012 restructuring of Greek sovereign debt. At the time of writing, Greece's actions had not triggered a narrow default: the government had not missed any payments, and creditors had not alleged a technical breach. Nevertheless, Greece demanded new terms and creditors consented, causing ratings agencies to conclude that a default had occurred. The Argentine debt crisis provides another example. All three major ratings agencies-S&P, Moody's and Fitch-listed Argentina as defaulting in November 2001, when it announced its intention to suspend payments, even though the government did not break a contract until January 2002, when it failed to make a required payment. 
How Often Do Countries Default?
We now summarize the frequency of defaults over the past two centuries. Our data, which extend the work of Tomz and Wright (2005) , cover 176 sovereign entities (counting countries and their historical counterparts as separate entities) from 1820 to The sovereigns were in existence for a total of 17,237 country-years. In 80% of those observations, sovereigns had outstanding debt and were, therefore, candidates for default.
In building the database, we restricted attention to national-level debts or debts guaranteed at the national level. We also focused on debts to private creditors, although we also gathered data on the rescheduling of debts owed to official creditors under the auspices of the Paris Club. Moreover, we made no distinction between default and repudiation; between defaults on interest and defaults on principal; or between defaults that covered only part of a sovereign's debts, versus defaults that affected all debts. 2 Finally, we do not include as defaults bouts of inflation that reduce the real value of debt issued in domestic currency.
In our database, there were 251 defaults by 107 distinct entities. The most frequent defaulters were Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela; each experienced at least 8 distinct spells of default, exemplifying a phenomenon Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) call "serial default." Ecuador and Honduras have each spent more than 120 years in default, beginning with their initial loans as members of the Central American Confederation in the 1820s, and Greece has been in default for more than 90 years of our sample. The largest default in history (by present value) was the 2012 Greek restructuring that covered more than €200b of privately held debt, followed by Argentina in 2001 and Russia in 1918. The solid line reveals four episodes in which at least 30% of the worlds' debtors (by number) have been in default, giving rise to the notion of a global default crisis. The first episode began in the 1820s, when a number of newly independent countries issued debt and immediately defaulted. The second episode, occurring in the 1870s, was associated with wars in Central and South America, followed by a fall in commodity prices. The third episode centers on the Great Depression, and the fourth is the global debt crisis of the 1980s. Figure 2 also shows defaults on official debts after World War II. 4 To date, there have been 425 renegotiations of official debts under the Paris Club.
The frequency of default is sensitive to the sample being analyzed. In our database, the unconditional probability of a borrower entering a default is 1.8% per year. This is similar to the 2% default probability that is a target for many calibrated models of sovereign default. However, this estimate averages over all countries, including many developed countries that have never defaulted. It also averages over time periods in which there was little borrowing and hence little incentive to default (for example, the Bretton-Woods system of restricted capital flows). If we restrict attention to countries that defaulted at least once, or look across all countries but exclude the years 1945-1980, the probability of default rises to 2.2%.
The frequency of default also depends on how one aggregates events. Our method of aggregation produces a fewer number of longer defaults. Other methods generate much higher default probabilities. For example, Arteta and Hale (2008) record 100 restructuring episodes with commercial creditors by 30 countries over a 25 year period, resulting in a 13% default probability per year.
The fact that this moment of the data is sensitive to reasonable changes in the definition of default suggests that an alternative moment -one more robust to changes in definition -should be used to calibrate models of default. One possibility is the fraction of time debtors spend in default. Across the entire sample, debtors spend almost 19% of the time in default.
How Long Do Defaults Last?
Like the probability of default, the duration of a default is sensitive to the definition researchers use. According to S&P, a default ends when "a settlement occurs and Standard & Poor's concludes that no further near-term resolution of creditors' claims is likely" (Beers and Chambers 2006) . Defined in this way, the mean length of a default across the entire sample is 9.9 years, dropping to 7.8 years for the period since 1970. The mean is driven by a small number of long-lasting defaults, such as the Russian repudiation of 1917. It may, therefore, be preferable to focus on the median, which is 6.5 years over the entire sample of 251 defaults.
There is substantial variation in the observed lengths of defaults, with the standard deviation 10.5 years. The distribution is also right-skewed with a skewness coefficient of 2.1. As noted by Pitchford and Wright (2008) , these facts suggest that the distribution of default lengths is approximately exponential. An exponential distribution of default lengths would result from a model in which the probability that a sovereign emerges from default is constant through time. This is a common assumption in calibrated sovereign default models, and an implication of the calibrated model of sovereign debt restructuring studied in Pitchford and Wright (2008) .
How Large Are Creditor Losses in a Sovereign Default?
Many theoretical models assume that creditors lose their entire claim when a sovereign defaults. This is far from true. Defaults typically conclude with a settlement in which old defaulted debt is exchanged for new debt securities.
Measures of creditor losses ("haircuts") compare the value of the old securities to the settlement offer. Nominal haircuts (Alesina and Weder 2002, Yue 2010) value both old and new debts at face value, ignoring that defaulted debts trade at a discount to face value, and that debts issued during a settlement tend to mature over a longer time horizon. The market haircut instead compares the market value of the settlement to the face value of the defaulted debt. This measure is easy to compute and appropriate when pricing sovereign debt, but it overstates the value of defaulted debt and hence exaggerates creditors' losses. To correct the problem, one should value old and new debts using the same discount rates, as in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2008) , who used the discount rates implied by the prices of the settlement debts ("exit yields"). 
How Does Sovereign Indebtedness Change After a Default?
Theoretical models of sovereign default often assume that a sovereign emerges from default without debt. This is not true in practice, and likely affects the quantitative performance of these models. After all, sovereigns that have no debt do not default, making serial default less likely. Benjamin and Wright (2008) show for their sample of 90 defaults that indebtedness, measured by the ratio of the face value of debt to GDP, does not fall, and may even rise, after a default. The median country ends the year of the settlement with a debtto-GDP ratio 5 percentage points higher than when they entered default. The increases in indebtedness are largest for low income countries (Easterly 2002 and Wright 2011a ).
The deferral of current, and the restructuring of future, repayments may also bring debt relief. Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2008) and Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati (2012) propose a measure of debt relief that values a country's new debt stock at the interest rates that prevail during non-crisis times. As these rates tend to be lower than those immediately following a settlement, this measure produces values for debt relief that are smaller than creditor losses. In the recent Greek restructuring, a 65% haircut for creditors was associated with a 60% reduction in the value of debt to the sovereign, while in Uruguay in 2003, a 13% haircut was associated with a 5% increase in the value of the sovereigns debt. An alternative approach based on the welfare cost of indebtedness measure of Dias, Richmond, and Wright (2012) which allows maturity extensions to raise welfare, could be a topic of future research. We begin by examining evidence on the quantity of borrowing. The data for the 19 th Century are unambiguous. In a study of 16 sovereign defaulters between 1820 and 1870, Tomz (2007) finds that only Greece was able borrow while in default. More importantly, the Greek case is the "exception that proves the rule": after having defaulted in 1826, Greece was only able to borrow in 1833 after securing loan guarantees from England, France and Russia.
The picture for the early to mid 20 th Century is muddled by disruptions to capital markets from two world wars followed by restrictions on capital flows under BrettonWoods. Following the end of World War 2, few countries borrowed internationally regardless of their past credit history leading some researchers to suggest that defaulting countries were not punished (Jorgenson and Sachs 1989, Eichengreen 1989).
For the modern (post 1970) period, official lending and bank decisions to roll-over past-due debt to avoid capital charges complicate the picture. Gelos, Sahay and Sandleris (2011) partially correct for this by defining a country as having market access if the country borrows using either bonds or syndicated bank loans, and if the face value of that country's debts increases. They find that being in default is associated with less access, with the average country taking 4.7 years to re-access markets following a default, with delays in re-access declining to 2.9 years more recently (not including unresolved defaults like Argentina 2001).
The debt stock of a country may increase without new borrowing if interest arrears are capitalized of if a country retires low face value debt by issuing high face value debt. To correct for this, Dias, Richmond and Wang (2012) define "normal" market access to be "net resource transfers" as defined by the World Bank in excess of 1% of GDP. By this measure, half of defaulting countries do not regain market access within seven years of the end of the default. This echoes the finding of Levy Yeyati (2009) who finds that net resource transfers fall by between 0.1% and 1% of GDP following a default. Dias, Richmond and Wang (2012) also find faster market reaccess following excusable defaults: half of all countries experiencing a natural disaster regain access within 3 years. Similarly, Cruces and Trebesch (2012) find that market access was slower following defaults that imposed haircuts in excess of 50%.
We next turn to evidence on the price of sovereign borrowing. In a study of 30 sovereign borrowers in 1872, Tomz (2007) finds that recent defaulting sovereigns were charged more than 25%, previous defaulters and new borrowers in excess of 8%, and countries with a good credit record around 5.5%. Significant yield differences survive controlling for measures of indebtedness and export earnings. Cruces and Trebesch (2012) find that the average defaulter paid between 300 and 400 basis more to borrower than non-defaulters in the modern period, with spreads above 500 basis points for sovereigns that imposed a haircut above 37%. Ozler (1992,1993) finds a small (20 basis point) effect of the defaults of the 1930s on borrowing in the period after 1970, with the size of the effect likely attenuated by the long time period involved.
These results are silent as to the mechanism that leads to higher spreads. If default reveals only that a country is a poor credit risk, higher yields should simply reflect the increased risk of lending. If high yields reflect punitive interest rates, however, then investors in these debts should earn excess returns. Lindert and Morton (1989) studied the ex post realized returns to holding sovereign debt from 1850 to 1983 and found no evidence of higher returns. Likewise, Klingen, Weder and Zettelmeyer (2004) found that returns on emerging market debt from 1970-2000 equaled those on US treasuries.
Taken together, and given the state of international capital markets in the early to mid 20 th Century, we choose to emphasize the results for both the modern, and 19 th Century, periods. Here the evidence suggests that market access is reduced both during, and for a period after, a default.
Other Costs of Default
Beyond losing access to capital, a country that defaults could suffer costs in other areas of international relations. For instance, it could become a target of military intervention. The idea of using arms to extract repayment may seem odd today, but many scholars believe this mode of enforcement prevailed until the early twentieth century. Finnemore (2003) , for example, writes that militarized debt collection was "accepted practice" until the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907. Mitchener and Weidenmier (2010) add that gunboat diplomacy was "effective and commonly used" to enforce debts before 1913.
Tomz (2007) maintains, however, that creditor governments generally did not use-or even threaten to use-force on behalf of bondholders. Even the 1902 intervention against Venezuela, often cited as the main example of a bondholder war, occurred because of tort claims, not debt default. Moreover, historical patterns of lending and repayment contradict the gunboat hypothesis. Investors lent to countries they had no chance of coercing, and debtors repaid militarily strong creditors no more often than weak ones. Notwithstanding these historical debates, all agree that today countries do not use military intervention to enforce debt contracts. Evidence for the trade credit mechanism is equally ambiguous. Commercial credit shrinks in the aftermath of default, and exports of sectors that depend on external credit tend to suffer the most (Zymek 2012) . However, the impact on commercial credit is brief, and not sufficient to explain the total drop in trade (Borensztein and Panizza 2009 ).
Finally, there is little evidence of asset seizures following a default. For much of history, the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevented creditors from suing a defaulter in foreign courts (Wright 2012) . Moreover, even if creditors could win a judgment, they would find little to take, since most borrowing countries do not own extensive assets in foreign jurisdictions. Several recent court cases have illustrated the nearimpossibility of taking sovereign assets as compensation for default ( 
Do Countries Default in "Bad Times"?
The relationship between output and default is potentially informative about the incentives of a sovereign to default. On the one hand, models of sovereign debt with incomplete debt contracts predict that defaults occur when output is low (Eaton and Gersovitz 1981) . On the other hand, "limited commitment" models with fully state contingent securities imply that the temptation to default is strongest when output is high (Kletzer and Wright 2001, Wright 2001 ).
The widespread belief that sovereigns default only in bad times was challenged by Tomz and Wright (2007) , who found a weakly negative relationship between default and output in a sample of 175 sovereign borrowers from 1820 to 2005. Defining low output as periods in which annual GDP data was below its Hodrick-Prescott trend, Tomz and Wright showed that sovereigns defaulted when output was below trend only 60% of the time, and that the average deviation of output from trend at the start of a default was only -1.6%. This result was robust for different time periods, samples of countries, and approaches to measuring trends in output. By contrast, calibrated default models predict that defaults almost always occur when output is below trend, with an average deviation from trend in excess of 8%.
This finding remains controversial. While Benjamin and Wright (2009) and Durdu, Nunes and Sapriza (2010) confirm these results using similar methods on different samples, De Paoli, Hoggarth, and Saporta (2006) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) find large output costs using different methods. Both of the latter studies emphasize that the output costs are larger when default is accompanied by a banking or currency crisis, with defaults in isolation associated with small output declines. Tomz and Wright (2007) suggest ways to reconcile their findings with the predictions of incomplete debt contract models. Perhaps bad times should be measured by changes in exports, government revenues, or world interest rates, rather than output. Another explanation is time aggregation: if sovereign default is associated with short, sharp declines in output, the relationship may be more clearly evident in quarterly data than in annual statistics (Mendoza and Yue 2011) . Indeed, Levy Yeyati and Panizza (2011) find a strong negative relationship at quarterly frequency in a sample of 23 defaults.
The Price of Sovereign Debt
In this section, we discuss issues that arise in the measurement of bond prices and returns. We illustrate these issues using research on the effect of the Gold Standard -a fixed exchange rate regime that existed in various forms between 1870 and 1931 -on borrowing costs.
Measuring the Cost of Borrowing
Long time series of data on the prices of sovereign bonds exist for many countries. The fact that most sovereigns do not regularly issue bonds in liquid markets, however, creates some practical problems. First, it is typically not possible to examine the yields on identical instruments issued by different countries. Hence, yield differences may reflect differences in instruments as much as differences in the characteristics of the country. Second, the absence of liquid markets means that price data can be volatile and are often missing. This leads many researchers to ignore capital gains on bonds and measure returns using the coupon yield (the ratio of the coupon to the price of the bond).
When looking at the history of bond yields, these issues are compounded with a third problem: many sovereign bonds took on forms that are exotic by modern standards. For example, 19 th Century bonds often included sinking fund arrangements and redemption clauses that gave sovereigns the obligation or the right to redeem bonds at pre-specified times. These embedded options make it difficult to calculate yields to maturity.
These difficulties need not be practical concerns if differences in bond contracts are uncorrelated with the institutions or variables of interest to the researcher. However, this does not appear to be the case. Countries that were deemed at greater risk of default tended to issue bonds at a discount with sinking fund arrangements requiring payment at par. Both of these features produce an upward trend in bond prices as the bond approaches either maturity or the date at which sinking fund redemptions take place, and hence falling coupon yields over time. By contrast, better credit risks sometimes issued bonds at a premium to par, which imparts a downward trend on their prices, and an upward trend on coupon yields. Researchers have responded to these problems in various ways, which we illustrate using the example of the effect the Gold Standard and borrowing costs.
What Effect Did Adherence to the Gold Standard Have on Borrowing Costs?
In an influential study, Bordo and Rockoff (1996) examined the coupon yields at an annual frequency of a sample of bonds issued by 10 sovereigns between 1870 and 1914, a period during which a number of countries adopted the gold standard. They found that adoption of the gold standard was associated with lower coupon yields of around 30 to 40 basis points per year, which hey attribute to a "good housekeeping seal of approval". Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) find similar results in a sample of 20 countries from 1870 to 1914, even after controlling for the stock of sovereign debt. However, they find that the re-adoption of gold in the interwar period was not associated with a reduction in borrowing costs. Ferguson and Schularick (2006) expand the sample to include the colonies and dominions of the British Empire. They find that lower borrowing costs for countries on gold do not survive controlling for membership of the British Empire.
The use of coupon yields means that these results may be a statistical artifact. For example, if the countries that adopted the gold standard in the 1870-1914 period were initially poor credit risks, they would have issued debts at a discount and with sinking fund arrangement. This would have imparted a mechanical downward trend to coupon yields that coincides their their adoption of the gold standard. Evidence for this comes from two recent studies which attempt to correct for these problems and find no evidence that the gold standard reduced borrowing costs.
Flandreau and Zumer (2004) also study coupon yields on the debt of 20 countries but are careful to choose bonds for which the embedded options are unlikely to be used. They find that the gold standard has no effect on yields after controlling for differences in monetary and fiscal policies. Alquist and Chabot (2011) collect monthly price data and compute holding period returns (which include capital gains) for a large number of sovereigns between 1870 and 1907. Data on capital gains are very volatile, but including them eliminates both sources of the drift in coupon yields .The authors estimate a factor pricing model for sovereign bonds and find no evidence of a "gold standard" or "empire" effect after controlling for exposure to common risk factors.
Domestic Politics
Most theories of sovereign debt emphasize international enforcement mechanisms. Governments repay foreign debts, it is said, to avoid adverse international reactions such as exclusion from foreign credit or punishment in other spheres of foreign affairs. In recent years, though, scholars have begun examining how domestic politics affects the calculation to repay. This is a welcome development. When governments appropriate funds to service the foreign debt, they are making a political decision to prioritize foreign obligations over alternative goals that might be more popular with domestic constituents. In this section, we review recent work about the effect of domestic politics on sovereign debt.
Nondiscrimination
Why would citizens ever want their government to repay foreigners, instead of defaulting on foreign debts and directing the savings toward domestic purposes? One possibility is that governments cannot repay their debts selectively (Broner, Martin and Ventura 2010; Broner and Ventura 2011; Guembel and Sussman 2009). If a government owes money to both foreigners and domestic citizens and cannot honor obligations to one group while defaulting on the other, the government might opt to pay creditors abroad, instead of declaring a comprehensive default that would also hurt creditors at home.
The argument seems most plausible in situations when debts take the form of bonds that are traded on secondary markets. If default ever loomed, foreign investors could sell the bonds to citizens of the country that was contemplating default. The transfer of ownership would increase the political costs of default, by putting bonds in the hands of people who could pressure the government to honor its debts. At the same time, the anonymity of secondary markets would make discrimination difficult. Not knowing who owns the debt, the government would find it hard to repay locals at the expense of foreigners.
Several facts seem consistent with this theory. First, many governments have large stocks of domestic as well as foreign debt. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) assembled data on public debt for 64 countries beginning in 1914 and found that nearly twothirds of public debt had been held by domestic residents historically. The stock of domestic debt has varied across countries and over time, however, in ways that should affect the incentive to repay. Future researchers should study the size and membership of the domestic creditor community, thereby offering new insight into the political consequences of default.
Second, for most of recorded history, private investors financed foreign governments almost entirely through bonds that were traded on international capital markets. Although the situation changed in the late 1960s, when commercial banks began lending to foreign governments on a large scale, bond issues have outstripped bank loans in every year since the mid-1990s. Moreover, emerging markets have repaid bondholders at a higher rate than commercial banks (Tomz 2007 ).
Other facts seem inconsistent with the theory. Most importantly, governments have often favored domestic creditors over foreign ones. Gelpern and Sester (2004, 794) examined recent defaults and concluded that, "in the world of sovereign debt, local and foreign investors buying the same paper rarely achieve what anyone would recognize as equal treatment." Some governments discriminate among holders of identical assets. Others transform their debt stocks in ways that permit discrimination. In 2000-2001, for example, Argentina induced domestic residents to shift into new instruments, which received better treatment than the bonds foreigners continued to hold.
Evidence from earlier periods supports the same conclusion. Waldenstrom (2010) studied bond markets during World War II, a time when capital controls segmented international markets. He found that yields on Danish bonds were lower in Denmark, where only Danish citizens could trade, than in Sweden, where foreign investors were active. The difference in yields is consistent with a model in which sovereigns can favor domestic investors over foreign ones.
Governments also have the means to treat some foreigners more favorably than others. In the interwar period, Germany offered full service to British investors but only partial payment to Americans. Agents implemented this policy by stamping each bond to indicate "U.K. domicile" or "U.S.A. domicile." Likewise, Romania serviced British-owned bonds, while withholding payment from American investors (Tomz 2007 ). These examples demonstrate that even when bonds are traded on international markets, governments can favor some bondholders over others.
Although governments can discriminate, they do not always exercise the option. Erce and Diaz-Cassou (2011) analyzed ten recent defaulters and found that four discriminated against foreign creditors; three adopted a neutral approach; and three afforded preferential treatment to foreign creditors. The authors admit, however, the three cases in the latter category-Argentina, Russia, and Ukraine-are contentious. Indeed, some researchers conclude that those same countries discriminated in favor of domestic residents (on Argentina and Russia, see Future research should investigate why governments discriminate in some cases but not in others, and whether domestic creditors get better treatment on average. We expect that conclusions will depend on the definition of default. S&P defines a domestic default as a situation in which the government explicitly violates the loan contract and excludes bursts of inflation that reduce the value of local currency debt. Applying the S&P definition, Kohlscheen (2010a) found that governments defaulted on external debts twice as often as domestic debts. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) define domestic defaults to include government abrogation of debt contracts or inflation rates above 20%. With this broader definition, they found that defaults on external debt were no more common than defaults on domestic debt.
Distribution
Even if governments could default selectively, some citizens may nonetheless prefer to repay the external debt. The reason is that debt repayment creates economic winners and losers (Frieden 1989 (Frieden , 1991 . On the one hand, repayment often requires fiscal adjustment that falls more heavily on some citizens than on others. Governments in crises historically have met their foreign obligations by imposing austerity programs that hurt government employees, the unemployed, and the poor (Johnson and Salop 1980; Vreeland 2002 ).On the other hand, a government that honors its foreign debts can preserve its international reputation, benefiting domestic constituents who value future transactions with foreigners. These domestic preferences could affect the government's decision to repay or default.
As a first step toward testing these hypotheses, Tomz (2004) analyzed a unique public opinion survey that was administered in Argentina during the debt crisis of 2001-2002. On average, people working in the public sector were less inclined to support the repayment of foreign debt than those in the private sector. Similarly, citizens who were poor or unemployed were less likely to support repayment than those with greater assets and more job security. On the other side of the ledger, citizens who assigned high utility to future capital infusions had a much stronger preference for debt repayment. Finally, the correlation between economic self-interest and policy preferences held most strongly for sophisticates, who scored the highest on a test of economic knowledge that was embedded in the survey.
Curtis, Jupille, and Leblang (2012) analyze the 2011 referendum on debt repayment in Iceland. They found that citizens voted their pocketbook interests. People with extensive investment assets, and those who would suffer from higher borrowing costs, voted for repayment; the unemployed voted for default. However, contrary to expectations, the connection between personal economic interest and voting behavior did not depend on voter sophistication, perhaps because extensive media coverage had made nearly all Icelanders knowledgeable about the issue. Future research should take advantage of public opinion polls in developed and developing countries to better understand domestic political cleavages and how they affect the incentive to default.
Domestic Institutions
Domestic groups have more political influence in some political systems than in others. Some authors argue that democracies are more creditworthy than autocracies, due to the greater frequency of checks and balances, or veto points, in democratic regimes. In an influential paper, North and Weingast (1989) argued that the Glorious Revolution enhanced the creditworthiness of the British government by empowering the parliament as a counterweight to the crown. Cox (2011) offers a related historical account: British creditworthiness improved when the parliament "established a workable system to hold the king's advisors accountable-what we now call ministerial responsibility."
The effect of checks and balances depends critically on the preferences of citizens and interest groups, however. In a detailed analysis of British and French history, Stasavage (2003) showed that checks and balances do not change outcomes unless groups with veto power have diverse attitudes about debt default. If, on the contrary, domestic groups agree on how to handle public debts, structural checks and balances are irrelevant. Stasavage (2011) subsequently examined the effect of representative assemblies in medieval and early modern Europe. He showed that assemblies enhanced creditworthiness in geographically small trade-dependent states, which had powerful mercantile interests that monitored the public credit.
Preliminary research suggests that, on average, veto players increase creditworthiness. For example, coalition governments default less often than unified ones (Saiegh 2009 ). Likewise, countries with strong courts are seen as more creditworthy than countries without independent judiciaries (Biglaiser and Staats 2012). Finally, parliamentary regimes pay their debts more often than other types of democracies (Kohlscheen 2010b , Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2009). It is not clear how to interpret these findings, though. Many presidential regimes-in which bills typically require the consent of both the executive and the legislature-have more veto points than parliamentary ones. We need more cross-country research about who enjoys veto power on issues of debt.
We also need more research on the policy to which a government would revert if one or more players blocked action. Does default require an affirmative act by government officials, or could it occur passively due to the failure of leaders to appropriate the funds for debt repayment? If repayment requires affirmative action, the presence of veto players could lead to a war of attrition (Alesina and Drazen 1991) between competing groups, which could delay payments to foreign creditors. Thus, the presence of veto players could either increase or decrease the probability of default, depending on the reversion point. This seems like an important area for future research.
Authors argue that democracies are more creditworthy than autocracies, not only because of constitutional checks and balances, but also because voters in a democracy would punish incumbents for defaulting on the foreign debt. Research about the effect of electoral democracy on debt has generated contradictory conclusions, however. Schultz and Weingast (2003) offer historical examples of democracies that could borrow more money, on better terms, than autocracies. In a large-scale statistical test, though, Saiegh (2005) found that democracies were more likely to reschedule their debts, and paid interest rates at least as high as autocracies. Enderlein, Müller, and Trebesch (2011) add that democracies are significantly more "aggressive" toward foreign creditors, as measured by an index of the coerciveness of debt rescheduling. Finally, democracies have not enjoyed higher credit ratings than autocracies (Archer, Biglaiser, and DeRouen 2007).
More research is needed to reconcile these contradictory findings. Perhaps beliefs about creditworthiness are manifested most clearly in the volume of lending, rather than interest rates or default rates. Consistent with this idea, Nelson (2009) and Beaulieu, Cox, and Saiegh (2012) show that democracies attract more foreign capital than autocracies.
Conclusions and Future Directions
Empirical research on sovereign debt has advanced remarkably in recent years. Progress has occurred for three reasons. First, researchers have assembled new datasets that reveal previously unknown facts about sovereign debt. We now have an unprecedented amount of information about the stock, maturity, currency composition, and contractual features of sovereign debt for most countries in the world, over longs sweeps of history. We also know how often countries have defaulted, how long defaults have lasted, and how defaults have been resolved. These discoveries would not have been possible without heroic efforts to unearth data from archives, and to harmonize statistics from disparate sources.
Second, researchers have used the new data to assess theories of sovereign debt. The central puzzle in the literature is the problem of enforcement: what motivates sovereigns to repay, and why do investors ever lend to them? Theorists have posited that governments repay to avoid the loss of access to international capital markets, the disruption of foreign trade, or damage to the country's reputation in other spheres of international affairs. Armed with new data, researchers are beginning to quantify these costs. At the same time, researchers are gaining insight about how investors fare when defaults occur. Macroeconomists can and should use these facts to judge and recalibrate models of debt.
Third, new data are shedding light on the economic and political conditions that contribute to default. How do business cycles in the borrowing country or the global economy affect the probability of default? Given that the choice between default and repayment is partly political, how do the preferences of voters and interest groups matter, and what role do political institutions play in determining whether sovereigns repay? We suspect these questions will become major foci in the literature, and will offer new opportunities for collaboration across the social sciences.
Throughout this essay, we have not only highlighted the discoveries that empirical researchers have made, but also identified gaps between theory and data. To some extent, the gaps exist for practical reasons: key measures remain unavailable for some concepts, countries, and time periods. Addressing these problems will require a continual, collaborative commitment to data collection. Even without new data, it should be possible to improve the dialogue between theoretical and empirical research. We have offered guidance for choosing which existing measures speak most directly to theory. We have also cited recent empirical findings that should inform the next generation of theoretical work. It is only by combining theory and data that future research will advance our understanding of sovereign debt, a central issue for economics, politics, and international relations.
